Abstract-
principles of visual perception developed in Gestalt psychology also play a role in the processing of text: "the cognitive principles which explain why humans 'sense' unity in a configuration of visual shapes are the basis of principles that explain why we 'sense' unity in a string of sentences " [1, p. 1] . In particular, she argues that Gestalt principles of Continuity, Similarity, and Proximity create the perception of unity in visuals, much the same way as a principle from linguistic pragmatics, Grice's Maxim of Relation, creates the perception of unity in text.
For example, the Gestalt principle of similarity, which says that viewers expect similar items to be related, is illustrated in Fig. 1 . The principle of Similarity compels viewers to perceive the elements in Fig. 1 as rows rather than as columns because the items in rows are similar, but those in columns are not.
Likewise, Campbell argues, Grice's Maxim of Relation says that readers (or listeners) expect items in a discourse to be related. (For the sake of brevity, we will use the term "readers" throughout when discussing textual perception; however, the principles described in this paper apply equally to both printed and spoken texts.) This effect is enhanced when related items are put into syntactically parallel constructions. For example, Campbell compares the following two versions of a passage from an article in a veterinary medicine journal (the verb phrases of interest have been italicized).
(1a) The dog was placed under general anesthesia . [T]he tibiotarsal joint was The sentences in (1a) are perceived as a unified whole because the verb phrases are the same (past tense, passive voice). The sentences in (1b) are perceived as less unified because the verb phrases are inconsistent (is placed is present tense, rather than past; and accessed is active voice, rather than passive).
While Campbell is to be credited for her insight into the relation between the Gestalt principles that govern visual perception and the Gricean maxims that govern textual perception, we believe that her argument stops short of exploring the full potential of this relationship. She argues that Grice's Maxim of Relation is the only one with analogs in visual perception, stating that there are "three additional principles of discourse coherence that are suggested by Grice's work, but that appear to have no analogs in Gestalt theory: manner, quantity, and quality" [1, p. 27 ]. Campbell comes to this conclusion because she assumes that all of Grice's maxims subserve discourse "coherence," and that all Gestalt principles subserve "unity"-the visual analog to coherence. She states, "As with coherence involving manner and quantity, coherence involving the quality of information appears to have no analogous principles in Gestalt theory" [1, p. 35 ].
We believe, however, that each of Grice's other maxims subserves a different property that, in turn, does have an analog in Gestalt psychology, as shown in Table I .
The relationship between the Gestalt principles and Grice's maxims is not obvious because both are stated in domain-specific terms (i.e., visual and textual). However, when viewed from a more abstract perspective, each of the four pairs is a special case of a metaprinciple, as outlined in Table II .
We feel that there are enough parallels between principles of Gestalt psychology and linguistic processing (especially as explained through Grice's maxims) to pursue the analogy. Our purpose here is to enumerate a number of these parallels that suggest that visual and textual processing are subserved by at least some of the same principles.
Our discussion is organized as follows. First, we elucidate four common properties of Gestalt psychology and linguistic theory. Second, we explore the concept of "bridging" in Gestalt psychology and linguistic theory. Third, we demonstrate analogs between specific Gestalt principles and Grice's maxims. Fourth, we investigate degrees of "goodness" for visual and textual processing, under ideal, normal, and degraded conditions.
GESTALT THEORY AND LINGUISTIC THEORY: SHARED THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Before looking at the particulars of Gestalt psychology and linguistic theory, we want to begin by [4, p. 260] . In the realm of language, the automatic nature of perception is summed up well by an anecdote cited by linguist Jerry Fodor.
One day my friend, colleague, and sometimes coauthor Merrill Garrett made what seems to me to be the deepest remark that I have yet heard about the psychological mechanisms that mediate the perception of speech. "What you have to remember about parsing," Merrill said, "is that basically it's a reflex" [7, Dedication] .
In short, the common general assumptions underlying Gestalt psychology and linguistic theory motivate an investigation of similarities between more particular components of these theories.
BRIDGING
One fundamental similarity between visual and textual processing is that they both utilize the concept of "bridging," that is, inferring information that is not explicitly presented. Take a moment to examine Fig Fig. 2 does not, upon inspection, contain any triangles; yet we nevertheless perceive them. Similarly, the Senator does not, upon inspection, actually state that Anita Hill is a liar; yet we nevertheless perceive that as his belief. In fact, the Senator actually went on to deny that allegation. (See Interchange 2b at the top of this page.). These two seemingly disparate examples-one visual, one verbal-have in common the fact that they evoke perceptions that are not, strictly speaking, part of the stimuli themselves. In Fig. 2 , we perceive a triangle that is literally not there; and in Interchange 2a, we perceive a proposition that is literally not stated.
ANALOGS BETWEEN GESTALT PRINCIPLES AND GRICE'S MAXIMS
In this section, we will look at principles from Gestalt psychology and demonstrate how they operate analogously to Grice's Maxims. In doing so, we will propose that both visual and textual perception adhere to four meta-principles that unite particular subprinciples within Gestalt theory and Gricean theory. The meta-principles are cohesion, clarity, completeness, and correctness.
Cohesion The first meta-principle, cohesion, says that perceivers will exercise the least effort in relating things. We have already looked at one example of cohesion at work in the visual and textual domains: the pluses and minuses displayed in Fig. 1 , and the passage from the veterinary journal in (1a).
As an additional visual example, consider Fig. 3 , which depicts coyote tracks entering and exiting a water puddle. Take a moment to trace the coyote's path. Fig. 3 illustrates the Gestalt principle of Continuity: viewers expect elements to extend along a continuous visual line. Chances are that when you traced the coyote's path, you went either from (a) to (d) or from (c) to (b). Explains Schriver, "The footprints at (d) are said to provide a good continuation of the footprints at (a) because they line up reasonably well . The footprints at (b) do not provide good continuation to those at (a) because of the sharp angle between the two paths" [3, p. 313] . It is important to note that the path from (a) to (b) is not an impossible route for the coyote to have taken-just that it is not the first one that we imagine. In the verbal domain, Grice's Maxim of Relation closely parallels the Gestalt principle of Continuity. According to the Maxim of Relation, readers expect discourse elements to be related to each other, and will interpret them as related in the absence of compelling reasons not to. For example, consider sentence (3).
(3) The woman reported that she had been experiencing headaches.
The most natural interpretation of she is as referring back to The woman mentioned earlier in the sentence, although (like the coyote path from (a) to (b)) it is also possible to interpret she as referring to a second female, one not mentioned in the sentence. What the Gestalt principle of Continuity and Grice's Maxim of Relation have in common is that perceivers tend to look for the "path of least resistance" in interpreting visual or textual information.
Violations of the Gestalt principle of Continuity arise when visual elements fail to follow a continuous line. For example, consider the graph in Fig. 4 , which was produced by a technical writing student. At first glance, the bar's value may appear to be more than 80%. Subjects were asked to read passage (4) quickly, to put it aside, and to recall as much information as possible. Some subjects, however, were given the title of the passage before they started reading: "Washing Clothes." Those subjects were able to recall a significantly greater amount of information from the passage, because the title enabled them to infer the relation among the ideas and enhanced the passage's comprehensibility.
Clarity
The second meta-principle, clarity, says that perceivers seek to impose a single interpretation on a stimulus, to the exclusion of others. In the visual realm, the Gestalt principle of Figure is relevant. This maxim states that readers expect unambiguous discourse and treat it as a "zero sum game." So strong is this expectation that, when presented with ambiguous structures in psycholinguistic experiments, readers often perceive only one interpretation at first and must be "coached" to perceive the second interpretation. For example, consider sentence (5).
(5) Jane hid the letter from Dan. As Walzer points out, the problem with (7) lies in the Maxim of Manner: designed is ambiguous, since it can mean either "to conceive" or "to execute." In this case, the engineer is clearly hoping the reader will impose the latter interpretation on designed.
The point is that the same impulse underlies perception in both the Gestalt principle of Figure Completeness The third metaprinciple, "completeness," says that perceivers tend to fill in missing information; that is, partial images or texts are perceived as complete. The Gestalt principle of Closure reflects this tendency. One illustration of this principle was given earlier in this paper, in the Kanisza triangle shown in Fig.  2 . Viewers unfailingly see two triangles in that image, even though no complete triangle is actually present. Likewise, viewers interpret an image like that in Fig. 7 as the number 8, even though it is technically not complete.
In the textual domain, Grice's Maxim of Quantity is a counterpart to the Gestalt principle of Did mine, too.
[12, p. 237]
Closure. This maxim says that readers assume they are getting "the whole truth"-i.e., that critical information is not being omitted.
Interestingly, perceivers can be misled in similar ways by violations of both the Gestalt principle of Closure and the Maxim of Quantity. Simply put, we draw the wrong conclusions if we do not have enough information. For example, consider Fig. 8 . This figure is compatible with the interpretation that it is a capital letter S. There is enough information to "fill in" that interpretation. However, this figure is too incomplete to be perceived as a number 8 (compare Fig. 7) .
A similar misinterpretation is fostered when readers are presented with discourse that is missing a crucial element. For example, compare sentences (8a) and (8b). (8a) John likes football more than Gloria does.
(8b) John likes football more than Gloria.
Sentence (8a) is similar to Fig. 6 : even though it does not explicitly state the proposition "John likes football more than Gloria likes football," the information can be inferred from the pro-form does, which substitutes for likes football. Sentence (8b), however, is similar to the more problematic image in Fig. 8 . In the absence of a pro-form following Gloria, we find ourselves unsure about how to interpret the sentence. Is it equivalent to "John likes football more than Gloria likes football?" Or to "John likes football more than he likes Gloria?" Just as Fig. 8 The second example goes back to the Rail Car Rhetoric case. The engineer claims that the rail car being designed "travels at speeds in excess of 250 mph"-a speed dramatically better than the existing system. The problem is that the engineer omits critical information: namely, that this speed was reached on new, state-of-the-art test track. (On the track actually in place, the proposed car's speed would not exceed that of the existing cars.) Since no information is provided about where the speeds were attained, the reader is likely to assume that the car was tested on the same type of track currently in place. This assumption, though, will lead the reader to the wrong inference.
Correctness The final meta-principle, "correctness," says that perceivers assume that they are receiving accurate information. In the realm of vision, this is illustrated by the Gestalt principle of Constancy, which states that objects remain stable across different contexts. For example, viewers perceive the higher A's in Fig. 9 as farther away than the lower A's, because Constancy dictates that the A's are all the same size. Actually, the A's are of different sizes, but they are perceived as the same, with the higher ones more distant than the lower ones.
An example of a figure that violates Constancy is given in Fig. 10 . Fig. 10 is "maddening" because it cannot be resolved as one "true" three-dimensional figure. If you cover up the top of the figure, it looks like a two-pronged tuning fork. If you cover up the bottom of the figure, it looks like a threepronged tuning fork. These two perceptions cannot coexist.
The tuning fork image in Fig.  10 is paralleled very closely by "garden path" sentences, such as the classic example in sentence (10) . (10) The horse raced past the barn fell.
Our tendency is to process nounverb sequences as filling the roles of agent and action; hence, we are "led down the garden path" and interpret The horse as the agent of raced. This interpretation works fine until we reach the end of the sentence-when we realize that The horse is the subject of fell. At this point we must reinterpret raced not as a past tense verb, but as a past participle modifier of The horse. This yields the correct interpretation of the sentence: "The horse that was raced past the barn fell." (Unlike the tuning fork example, we are able to resolve this sentence into one final interpretation.)
In the realm of linguistic perception, the principle of Constancy is paralleled by Grice's Maxim of Quality. If the Maxim of Quantity says that readers expect "the whole truth" in discourse, the Maxim of Quality says that they expect "nothing but the truth." In other words, readers assume that they are being given accurate descriptions based on sufficient evidence. While falsehoods are obvious examples of violations of Quality, (mis)leading questions represent another less obvious case. For example, O'Barr [13] cites a study in which two groups of viewers were shown identical footage of a traffic accident. After viewing the film, one group was asked question (11a).
(11a) "Did you see a broken headlight?" Thirty percent replied "Yes." The second group was asked question (11b).
(11b) "Did you see the broken headlight?" Seventy percent replied "Yes." The definite pronoun the in (11b) presupposes the existence of a broken headlight; therefore, the second group "believed" that they had seen one.
To summarize this section, principles of visual perception from Gestalt psychology have close parallels with the principles of linguistic perception encompassed in Grice's maxims. In both the visual and the linguistic realms, perceivers expect information that is cohesive, clear, complete, and correct.
DEGREES OF "GOODNESS"
In this final section, we want to raise the idea that both visual and textual perception operate on a continuum of "goodness." That is, viewers and readers are rarely presented with perfect stimuli upon which to base their perceptions; instead, they must constantly recover and reconstruct missing components in the visual and written input. At the same time, visual or linguistic stimuli that are degraded beyond what we call the "point of recoverability" cannot be successfully perceived. We will illustrate these "degrees of goodness" with three examples: ideal stimuli, normal stimuli (i.e., somewhat degraded but still recoverable), and useless stimuli (i.e., degraded beyond the point of recoverability).
As a visual illustration of the highest degree of goodness, consider the image in Fig. 11 .
On the discourse level, a high degree of goodness is illustrated by (12a), a notice from a doctor sent to a woman after her annual Pap smear.
(12a) I have received a report of the Pap smear taken from the cervix at the time of your recent examination. This Pap smear shows no evidence of abnormal or unusual cells. Your smear is therefore normal. We will contact you in 12 months to schedule another Pap smear.
Both Fig. 11 and passage (12a) illustrate 100% completeness. The viewer does not need to "bridge" in order to create the visual image of a square. Likewise, the reader does not need to "bridge" in order to derive the message that her Pap smear is normal.
Real life, however, rarely presents us with 100% information; indeed, viewers and readers not only are capable of filling in incomplete information, but in fact (unconsciously) expect to have to fill it in [14, pp. 211-212] . The need to "bridge" is a normal state of affairs. Real life, then, often presents us not with a perfect figure but with one like Fig. 12 .
The image in Fig. 12 Now compare (13c), reproduced as it appeared (in its entirety) on a plastic bag that was sent in to Consumer Reports by a reader [16] .
(13c) THIS IS NOT A TOY, ETC.
Passage (13c) is woefully inadequate as a warning: it is not explicitly labeled as one; it does not state the consequences; and it does not even state the action that the reader is being directed to take. While a reader might be able to infer these items, there is sort of a catch-22 involved: any reader who has the requisite background knowledge to draw these inferences probably does not need the warning in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Much research has been done on visual unity, but without regard to its analogs in discourse processing. Likewise, much research has been done on discourse unity, but without regard to its analogs in visual perception. Campbell's work constitutes a breakthrough study in this respect. However, she stops short of exploring the full potential of her basic premise, i.e., that discourse and visual perception proceed analogously.
We have tried to show that visual and textual perception exhibit striking parallels in terms of the strategies that viewers and readers use to impose unity upon images and texts. In particular, we have explored parallels between Gestalt principles of Continuity, Figure/ Ground, Closure, and Constancy, and Grice's Maxims of Relation, Manner, and Quantity, and Quality. These parallels are summarized in Table III .
Such research has direct implications for a better understanding of both visual and textual elements in fields such as technical writing. For example, one practical byproduct of such research is a refinement of principles for constructing graphics in technical writing [3] , [17] . Second, one of the most debated issues in current linguistic theory, is whether innate linguistic ability reflects a specific psychological module or, conversely, a manifestation of more general intellectual capabilities. Although our primary goal has been to show how principles of visual perception can enhance understanding of how readers process visual texts, the discovery of analogs between textual and visual perception could provide an important new perspective on larger theoretical questions such as the nature of our innate linguistic ability.
TABLE III PARALLELS BETWEEN GESTALT PRINCIPLES AND GRICE'S MAXIMS

